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Introduction 
Whren v. United States1 is surely a leading contender for the most 
controversial and heavily criticized Supreme Court case that was decid-
ed in a short, unanimous opinion.2 The slip opinion is only thirteen 
pages long, and provoked no dissents or even concurring opinions. 
Critical reaction has been overwhelmingly negative.3 Criticism notwith-  
†  Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland 
State University; J.D. University of Michigan School of Law; B.A. Goshen 
College. 
1. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
2. See Arnold H. Loewy, Cops, Cars, and Citizens: Fixing the Broken Balance, 
76 St. John’s L. Rev. 535, 557 (2002) (referring to the “surprising unanimity” 
of the Whren Court’s “implicit sanctioning of unbridled arbitrariness or 
racial profiling in upholding the constitutionality of a stop by plain clothes 
vice squad officers to issue a traffic warning to individuals whom they 
suspected of drug dealing”). 
3. For critical commentary, see David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and 
All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 
87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 544 (1997); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, 
Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 271 (1997); Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in 
Criminal Adjudication, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 2001, 2005 (1998); Tracey Maclin, 
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standing, the Court has not retreated from Whren, but continues to 
repeat its core holding.4 
Some justices who joined the unanimous opinion have since express-
ed reservations about the breadth of powers available to police in traffic 
stops. Justice Kennedy, writing just a year after Whren, dissented from 
the Court’s holding in Maryland v. Wilson5 that passengers during a 
lawful traffic stop could be ordered to exit the car with no individual-
ized suspicion. He stated, “[w]hen Whren is coupled with today’s hold-
ing, the Court puts tens of millions of passengers at risk of arbitrary 
control by the police. If the command to exit were to become common-
place, the Constitution would be diminished in a most public way.”6 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and 
Breyer, likewise raised questions in a concurring opinion in Arkansas v. 
Sullivan.7 These justices joined the majority “[g]iven the Court’s current 
case law”—namely Whren.8 Yet Justice Ginsburg added that “if exper-
ience demonstrates ‘anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-
 
Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333 (1998); Anthony 
C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 
74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 956 (1999); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye 
and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial 
Profiling, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1409 (2000); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement 
by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches 
Without Cause, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 296 (2001); Devon W. Carbado, 
(E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 946 (2002); Loewy, 
supra note 2; Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became 
the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United 
States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 Geo. L.J. 1005 
(2010). But see Steve Holbert & Lisa Rose, The Color of Guilt & 
Innocence: Racial Profiling and Police Practices in America 120 
(2004) (defending Whren and stating that “[a]t first glance, it may appear that 
these stops are intended to target those of a particular ethnicity,” but “a 
well-trained officer need not consider the race of the driver when targeting 
suspected violators”). 
4. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013) (citing Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 813 (1996)) (“[A] stop or search that is object-
ively reasonable is not vitiated by the fact that the officer’s real reason for 
making the stop or search has nothing to do with the validating reason. 
Thus, the defendant will not be heard to complain that although he was 
speeding the officer’s real reason for the stop was racial harassment.”); 
Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771–72 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(re-stating the holding of Whren, and rejecting an attempt by the Arkansas 
Supreme Court to read Whren narrowly). 
5. 519 U.S. 408 (1997). 
6. Id. at 423 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
7. 532 U.S. 769, 772–73 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
8. Id. at 773 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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offense arrests,’ I hope the Court will reconsider its recent precedent”9—
an apparent reference to both Atwater v. City of Lago Vista10 and 
Whren. Justice Ginsburg likewise quoted earlier decisions suggesting 
that precedent should be overruled “when necessary ‘to bring its opin-
ions into agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertain-
ed.’”11 
In recent years “facts newly ascertained” have indeed come to 
light—such as clear statistical evidence that the New York City Police 
Department’s stop-and-frisk program was being conducted in a patently 
unconstitutional manner, even under such generous standards as Whren 
and Terry v. Ohio.12 New York police conducted a huge number of 
stops—over 685,000 stops in 2011, up from around 97,000 in 2002.13 
Suspects were frisked for weapons in about half of these stops, but a 
weapon was actually found in only 1.5% of the frisks.14 Prosecutors ob-
tained convictions for only around three percent of stops.15 Those per-
sons stopped were disproportionately African American or Hispanic—
fifty-two percent and thirty-one percent, respectively.16 And while min-
orities were the overwhelming targets of stops and frisks, the “hit rate” 
for searches of minorities was lower than that for whites.17 
These results were both predictable and actually predicted.18 As 
Tracey Maclin has explained, this discovery is nothing new: “In Amer- 
 
9. Id. at 773 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 
318, 353 (2001)). 
10. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
11. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 773 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Vasquez v. 
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986)). 
12. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
13. Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., A 
Report on Arrests Arising from the New York City Police Depart-
ment’s Stop-and-Frisk Practices 5 (Nov. 2013) [hereinafter N.Y. Att’y 
Gen. Report]; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 
573–74, 591–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting the “uncontested statistics”). 
14. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 573. 
15. N.Y. Att’y Gen. Report, supra note 13, at 3, 6 (citing statistics from 
2009–2012). 
16. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 574. 
17. Id. (“Weapons were seized in 1.0% of the stops of blacks, 1.1% of the stops 
of Hispanics, and 1.4% of the stops of whites. Contraband other than weapons 
was seized in 1.8% of the stops of blacks, 1.7% of the stops of Hispanics, and 
2.3% of the stops of whites.”). 
18. See Harris, supra note 3, at 560 (“We can comfortably predict the effect of 
Whren: police will use the case to justify and expand drug interdiction efforts 
against people of color.”). 
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ica, police targeting of black people for excessive and disproportionate 
search and seizure is a practice older than the Republic itself.”19 
Given the immediate and sustained scholarly criticism of Whren, 
and the significant and ever-growing body of evidence of the real harms 
inflicted through arbitrary and discriminatory policing, why did all nine 
justices of the Supreme Court join in a brief opinion squarely rejecting 
the argument that racially discriminatory law enforcement was un-
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment? 
The answer lies at least in part in the baseline from which the Court 
chose to evaluate police conduct in pretextual stops. From one perspect-
ive, the question in Whren is whether police can pull over a motorist 
when the police “have probable cause to believe [the motorist] has com-
mitted a civil traffic violation.”20 From this perspective, it seems hard 
to see how the answer could be “no”—after all, “[a]s a general matter, 
the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have 
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”21 The 
text of the Fourth Amendment limits government discretion by, among 
other things, requiring individualized suspicion—probable cause that is 
particular to the place, person, or item sought.22 Once there is probable 
cause, the Fourth Amendment’s concern seems to be satisfied. 
The Court found itself at loss to imagine a world in which police 
would be constitutionally prohibited from making a traffic stop in the 
face of clear evidence that a traffic violation had in fact occurred: “we 
are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at what point a 
code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that infrac-
tion itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of 
enforcement.”23 In the end, the Court could not imagine things from a 
different perspective: “we think there is no realistic alternative to the 
traditional common-law rule that probable cause justifies a search and 
seizure.”24 
But there is another baseline against which one might evaluate the 
reasonableness of police conduct—the baseline created by police policy 
and practice. When the police consistently choose to enforce the law—
here, the traffic code—by using standards different from those written 
into the code, then the appropriate baseline for assessing the reasonable-
ness of police conduct is by evaluating that conduct against the police 
department’s own chosen enforcement practices and policies. As stated 
 
19. Maclin, supra note 3, at 333. 
20. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996). 
21. Id. at 810. 
22. U.S. Const. amend IV. 
23. Whren, 517 U.S. at 818. 
24. Id. at 819. 
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well before Whren by Wayne LaFave: “[i]t is the fact of the departure 
from the accepted way of handling such cases which makes the officer’s 
conduct arbitrary, and it is the arbitrariness which in this context con-
stitutes the Fourth Amendment violation.”25 
The Court’s decision to evaluate police conduct against the written 
traffic code, as opposed to evaluating police conduct against police prac-
tice and procedure, is what led the justices to unanimously conclude 
that police conduct must be reasonable when there is probable cause of 
a traffic infraction. This framing of the issue is one of the fundamental 
mistakes of Whren.26 It represents a failure by the Court to hold police 
to the standards that police create themselves, resulting in a clear prac-
tice of arbitrary—and thus unreasonable—policing. 
Part I frames the problem in Whren with a story. Part II sets forth 
the fundamental Fourth Amendment principle underlying this article—
the prohibition against arbitrary search and seizure. Part III explains 
how arbitrariness applies to Whren, and to police enforcement policies. 
Part IV describes pretextual traffic stops as a form of entrapment. Part 
V addresses the Whren Court’s concern that the Fourth Amendment 
should not vary from place to place. Part VI notes that arbitrariness is 
distinct from discrimination, and acknowledges that ending arbitrari-
ness would not necessarily end discriminatory law enforcement. 
I. Written Rules Versus Enforcement Practice: 
Creating the Conditions for Arbitrariness 
Every fall, when I teach Whren v. United States,27 most of my stud-
ents seem to share the basic framing adopted by the justices: if the 
police have probable cause that a motorist has violated the traffic code, 
the resulting traffic stop must therefore be constitutionally reasonable. 
To hold otherwise would be perverse—somehow forbidding the police 
from conducting a traffic stop when it is plain a violation has been 
committed. 
After hearing this near-consensus, I have begun sharing with my 
students the following story: 
This fall, as every fall, I distribute and then read aloud my Criminal 
Procedure syllabus: class begins promptly at 2:00 p.m., and any student 
entering after 2:00 p.m. will be marked late—and suffer a corresponding 
penalty in the class participation grade. 
For the first few classes, nervous supplicants come to the podium 
after class, begging forgiveness for arriving one or two minutes late— 
25. Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment 120–21 (3d ed. 1996). 
26. Another fundamental mistake, discussed repeatedly by other commentators, 
is the Court’s dismissal of the concern that arbitrary police enforcement will 
in fact be used to conduct racially discriminatory policing. See supra note 3. 
27. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
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always with a good reason. I reassure each of them that I will not 
penalize them for their minor tardiness; I am understanding professor. 
After a few weeks, my students have learned that my written 2:00 p.m. 
policy actually has a built-in buffer zone. Only students who show up 
significantly late are penalized. By halfway through the semester stud-
ents even have a pretty good sense of what “significantly late” means—
somewhere around five to six minutes. I have never told them there is 
a five-minute grace period, but they have learned it nonetheless. 
Near the end of the term, one of my students (Maggie) walks into 
class at 2:03 p.m.—plainly a few minutes late for class. After class, 
Maggie smiles politely at me as she walks past my podium on her way 
out, and I inform her, “Just so you know, you just lost five class partici-
pation points for your tardiness today.” Stunned and (initially) asham-
ed, she turns red and mumbles an apology. 
Later, having had the time to compose herself and talk with other 
students in the class, Maggie’s embarrassment turns to anger. She peti-
tions me to remove the penalty; I refuse. She then petitions the academ-
ic standards committee, arguing that my imposition of a penalty on her 
was unreasonable. 
You are on the committee. I defend my sanction by pointing to the 
written policy in the syllabus, adding that I also read the policy aloud 
on the first day of class. 
So, I ask my students: Am I being unreasonable? 
My students overwhelmingly conclude that I am. What is the nat-
ure of my unreasonableness? It is clear—my imposition of a sanction 
on Maggie is arbitrary. It is true that I wrote and explained a 2:00 p.m. 
attendance policy. But then, through my conduct, I repeatedly and 
consistently adopted a “de minimis” enforcement practice. My students 
learned from my consistent enforcement pattern that in practice they 
would not suffer a penalty as long as they showed up within about five 
minutes of the beginning of class. My imposition of a sanction on 
Maggie is unreasonable. 
In addition, my sanction may or may not also be discriminatory—
it may be motivated by some improper consideration, such as Maggie’s 
gender or race. But apart from whether the policy is discriminatory,  
it is clearly arbitrary, and objectionable—and unreasonable—on that 
ground alone. 
This is the story that is entirely missing from the unanimous opin-
ion in Whren. 
II. Arbitrary Law Enforcement Is Unreasonable 
Arbitrary law enforcement is unreasonable, and the Supreme Court 
has said so many times. According to the Court, “[t]he basic purpose of 
[the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this 
Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
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arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”28 And the Court has re-
peatedly recognized, “‘[t]he security of one’s privacy against arbitrary 
intrusion by the police’ as being ‘at the core of the Fourth Amendment 
and basic to a free society.’”29 
Much has been written about Whren’s conclusion that even an 
overtly discriminatory subjective motivation does not render a traffic 
stop unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.30 Those concerns are 
important, and ongoing empirical evidence continues to bear out the 
concern that some motorists—such as African Americans—are dispro-
portionately subjected to stops and frisks.31 
Arbitrariness is an evil related to but distinct from discrimination. 
Apart from whether a government official is motivated by some improp-
er concern—such as race—government action is also objectionable when 
it is arbitrary. Tracey Maclin explained, “[e]ven where there is no proof 
that the police are acting with a specific racial intent, a police intrusion 
may violate Fourth Amendment norms due to its arbitrary nature.”32 
 
28. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); see also City of Ontario 
v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 755–56 (2010) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ 
Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989)) (“The [Fourth] Amendment guarantees 
the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and 
invasive acts by officers of the Government.”). 
29. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 
338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)). Other Fourth Amendment cases in which the Court 
has expressed a concern against “arbitrary” government action include 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975), United States 
v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975), United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 554–56 (1976), and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–55 (1979). 
See also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (stating that arbi-
trariness is one of the concerns underlying void-for-vagueness doctrine). 
30. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconsti-
tutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United 
States, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 882 (2015) (discussing Whren’s permissiveness 
regarding blatant racial discrimination); see also supra note 3 (listing articles 
critical of Whren). 
31. See, e.g., Ronnie A. Dunn, Racial Profiling: A Persistent Civil Rights Challenge 
Even in the 21st Century, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 957 (2016) (discussing 
racial disparities in an empirical study of traffic stops). 
32. Maclin, supra note 3, at 373. See also LaFave, supra note 25, at 120–21 
(“It is the fact of the departure from the accepted way of handling such 
cases which makes the officer’s conduct arbitrary, and it is the arbitrariness 
which in this context constitutes the Fourth Amendment violation.”); Loewy, 
supra note 2, at 571 (“If the local police regulations forbid a plainclothes 
police officer to make a traffic stop unless certain specified special circum-
stances are present, it is hard to construct an argument that the stop, in the 
absence of such circumstances, was reasonable.”). 
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One form of arbitrariness is when government officials randomly 
target persons without any good reason to do so.33 Under the Fourth 
Amendment, reasonable suspicion or probable cause that the individual 
is committing a crime or traffic infraction ordinarily provides the “good 
reason” for the government action.34 So long as reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause is present, the government has some non-arbitrary rea-
son for acting. This is the logic used in Whren: “[a]n automobile stop is 
thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreason-
able’ under the circumstances. As a general matter, the decision to stop 
an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to 
believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”35 
But this is not the only way government conduct can be arbitrary. 
If the government, by policy or practice, consistently underenforces the 
law in a particular way, then a random act of strict enforcement is also 
arbitrary. 
III. Police Accountability for Enforcement Policy 
It is clear that arbitrary government conduct is unreasonable. To 
assess how this principle applies to pretextual stops, it is critical to 
determine the appropriate baseline, a concept mentioned above. Should 
arbitrariness be measured against the written traffic code, or against 
police enforcement policy and practice? 
The story in Part I is meant to elicit the intuition that enforcement 
practice, and not merely written policy, is a critical aspect of measuring 
arbitrariness. In that story, why should we measure the professor’s sanc-
tion against his enforcement practice as opposed to his written policy? 
The most natural answer is that it is the professor himself who chooses 
his written policy as well as how he will enforce that policy. It is the 
professor who has chosen to consistently allow a five to six minute de 
minimis allowance to his 2:00 p.m. starting time. Under that regime, if 
ten students each arrives three minutes late, nine are given a pass, and 
one is sanctioned, that sanction is arbitrary. 
In the context of police traffic enforcement, it is police departments 
who choose how to enforce the written traffic code. The concern about 
 
33. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
Minn. L. Rev. 349, 411 (1974) (noting that the Fourth Amendment is 
concerned not only with unjustified search and seizure but also “arbitrary 
searches and seizures,” namely those “conducted at the discretion of executive 
officials, who may act despotically and capriciously in the exercise of the 
power to search and seize”). 
34. Lewis R. Katz, Introduction to Whren at Twenty: Systemic Racial Bias and 
the Criminal Justice System, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 923, 928 (2016). 
35. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). 
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government arbitrariness is therefore fundamentally about holding the 
police accountable for their own policies and procedures. 
It is frequently observed, in the context of Whren, that total comp-
liance with the traffic code is nearly impossible, due to the extraordin-
ary breadth, detail, and complexity of the traffic code. David Rudovsky 
argued, “[s]ince virtually every driver commits violations of the traffic 
laws on a regular basis, the police have enormous discretion to effect-
uate stops of a very high number of cars, thus presenting the critical 
issue of pretextual stops and searches.”36 David Harris observed that 
due to the “the comprehensive scope of state traffic codes . . . no driver 
can avoid violating some traffic law during a short drive, even with the 
most careful attention.”37 
Commentators have repeatedly argued that due to the comprehend-
sive and detailed nature of the traffic code, permitting pretextual stops 
so long as there is probable cause of some traffic violation effectively 
gives the police unfettered discretion—the power to stop any motorist 
at any time.38 
These observations are true, although there is a deeper issue at play 
that has received less critical attention. It is not merely the case that 
compliance is difficult because traffic codes are lengthy and complex. 
More fundamentally, it is the police themselves that create the condi-
tions of near-uniform noncompliance with the written traffic code. 
Police departments around the country consistently—and by deliberate 
policy—underenforce the written traffic code. In fact, they often do so 
in relatively predictable ways. 
Speed limits are a simple traffic rule, yet those limits are routinely 
and consistently violated. The ubiquity of speeding is not due to the 
complexity or breadth of the traffic code—the speed limit is a simple 
and straightforward rule, posted on clear signs at regular intervals, and 
understood by most motorists. The fact that the flow of regular traffic 
on an ordinary highway is often proceeding at around five (or more) 
miles per hour (mph) above the speed limit is not a reflection of driv-
er confusion. It is due to one fact: the knowledge, on the part of the 
 
36. Rudovsky, supra note 3, at 318. 
37. Harris, supra note 3, at 545. 
38. See Harris, supra note 3, at 582 (“Whren leaves us in an unsatisfactory 
situation. Any time we use our cars, we can be stopped by the police virtually 
at their whim because full compliance with traffic laws is impossible.”); 
Oliver, supra note 3, at 1414 (“If several, or in the case of traffic offenses, 
most, persons are committing the same offense and practical realities preclude 
an officer from stopping them all, then probable cause does not meaningfully 
limit an officer’s discretion.”); Rudovsky, supra note 3, at 318 (“Since virtually 
every driver commits violations of the traffic laws on a regular basis, the police 
have enormous discretion to effectuate stops of a very high number of cars, 
thus presenting the critical issue of pretextual stops and searches.”). 
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drivers, that the police will not pull over cars traveling five mph over 
the speed limit. 
Is it possible to determine exactly what law enforcement policies 
are with respect to enforcement of speeding laws? In the United States, 
law enforcement is highly decentralized. Even in major cities, there does 
not seem to be publicly available written policy informing the public of 
police speed limit enforcement policies. 
In the United Kingdom, the Crown Prosecution Service actually 
publishes standards for speed limit enforcement.39 The CPS relies on 
guidelines established by the Association of Chief Police Officers, an 
organization that coordinated law enforcement policy across England, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland.40 These guidelines establish the circum-
stances under which “enforcement will normally occur”—that is to say, 
when the police will pull over a driver and issue a citation.41 In ordinary 
circumstances, the enforcement standard “is normally 10 per cent over 
the speed limit plus 2 mph.”42 When a driver is speeding very excess-
ively—above an even higher threshold—the officer may issue a court 
summons rather than a citation with a fixed monetary penalty.43 That 
higher “summons” standard is also set forth in the guidelines: 
Speed limit: 20 mph  
ACPO charging threshold: 24 mph 
Summons: 35 mph 
* * *  
Speed limit: 40 mph 
ACPO charging threshold: 46 mph 
Summons: 66 mph 
* * *  
Speed limit: 60 mph 
ACPO charging threshold: 68 mph 
Summons: 86 mph44 
 
39. Road Traffic Offences: Guidance on Fixed Penalty Notices: Speed Enforce-
ment, The Crown Prosecution Serv. http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_ 
to_r/road_traffic_offences_guidance_on_fixed_penalty_notices/#speed 
[https://perma.cc/JT6G-SFG4] (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
40. See History and Background, Nat’l Police Chiefs’ Council http:// 
www.npcc.police.uk/About/History.aspx [https://perma.cc/H4GY-C7P4] 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2016). In 2015, the ACPO was replaced by a different 
body, the National Police Chief’s Council. Id. 
41. The Crown Prosecution Serv., supra note 39. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
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Finally, the guidelines provide that “a police officer has discretion 
to act outside of them providing he acts fairly, consistently and propor-
tionately.”45 
Law enforcement agencies in the United States do not engage in 
this type of transparency about their enforcement policies.46 From re-
gion to region, drivers (partly through trial and error) develop local 
knowledge about enforcement standards. 
While there do not seem to be published speed enforcement policies 
in the United States, it is possible to find individual officers sharing and 
discussing enforcement practices on various internet discussion forums. 
While these comments by no means represent a statistical sampling of 
department policies, they nevertheless provide some scattered insight. 
A discussion thread on “forums.officer.com” includes the following 
responses by pseudonymous users who purport to be current or former 
law enforcement officers47: 
 
Dingo990: 
I’ve heard stories of cops in such and such department that will 
give you a ticket for 4 over the speed limit. Personally I’ve worked 
for three departments in my career and I’ve never known an 
officer to do that. 
Me personally, I’m pretty lean on speed enforcement. I typically 
give 12-15mph leeway on highways and 8-10 over on residential 
streets. 
10 over is pretty much the standard among cops I’ve spoken to.48 
Axelfoley4: 
 
45. Id. See also Kenny Hemphill, How Far over the Limit Before You Get a 
Speeding Ticket?, mental_floss (Apr. 8, 2015), http://mentalfloss.com/uk/ 
society/28119/how-far-over-the-limit-before-you-get-a-speeding-ticket 
[https://perma.cc/HA7C-LC46] (“Generally, a fixed penalty notice is triggered 
by travelling at 10% above the legal limit plus 2mph, and a court summons 
by a speed between 11mph and 26mph above the limit, depending on the speed 
limit on the road.”). 
46. While states do not appear to publish standards for when an officer should 
(or may) pull over a driver, some states do set forth explicit “buffer zones” 
in the penalties that can be imposed. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 318.18(3)(b) 
(West Supp. 2016) (establishing that the statutory penalty for a driver exceed-
ing the limit by one to five mph is merely a “warning”). 
47. All mistakes in the following comments were in the original source material.  
48. Thread: How Much Over the Speed Limit Can You Go Without Getting 
Pulled Over by Radar Gun?, Officer.com (July 26, 2010, 8:25 PM), 
http://forums.officer.com/t150556/ [https://perma.cc/QV2H-HPP6] [hereinafter 
Officer.com]. 
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in the chicagoland area, most of the guys i work with wont stop 
until 15+ over on residential, i tend to go 11+ for myself. they 
wont stop on the higway until 80mph since its a 55mph limit. its 
because of the risks making stops on the highway here.49 
VA Dutch (purportedly a former deputy sheriff): 
The law says that 1mph over is speeding. Of course, I know of no 
cop who will stop you or cite for 1mph. 
* * *  
My general feeling was (and I have been a civilian for years now) 
that 12 mph over the limit in a 45-mph zone or less might cause 
a traffic stop. 15 mph over the limit in faster zones would be good 
reason to see blue lights behind you. 
* * *  
Most folks generally go 5 to 10 mph over the limit in light traffic 
conditions, so stay in the slower end of that camp and keep your 
fingers crossed! Just don’t be the car in front or leading the pack 
.....LOL!50 
Jeeves44: 
It all depends on traffic and my mood. I’ve stopped for 5 over and 
have not stopped for 15 over. I’ve written tickets for 6 over and 
given warnings for 30 over.51 
Rick Bruno (purportedly a former police commander in Illinois): 
Depending on road/weather conditions, I gave the first 14 miles 
to the motorist. If they were 15 over, I’d stop them. 
 * * *  
Sometimes, on Special Operation Assignments the discretion was 
taken away from me. The order might be to stop and ticket any-
one driving over 10 miles over the limit. These were usually the 
result of citizen complaint about speeders in residential areas.52 
 
49. Id.  
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Thread: How Much over the Speed Limit Do Most Officers Let You Go 
Before Pulling You Over?, Quora.com (Nov. 2, 2014), https://www.quora. 
com/How-much-over-the-speed-limit-do-most-officers-let-you-go-before-
pulling-you-over?share=1#!n=12 [https://perma.cc/GT98-EMKX]. 
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Comments left in internet forums should always be taken with a 
grain of salt, and there is no way to ensure that all comments purport-
ing to come from law enforcement officers are genuine. That said, the 
comments reflect a few themes that are consistent with experience. The 
commentators acknowledge that police departments in the United Sta-
tes do not conduct traffic stops for very minor infringements of the 
speed limit. The “buffer zone” is consistently described as relatively 
large—ten to fifteen mph over the speed limit. Some commenters note 
that the enforcement limits are discretionary and largely left up to the 
individual officer. Others note that at least sometimes, supervisors set 
the enforcement limits. 
Finally, it is worth noting an additional type of response on these 
discussion forums. Some officers seem to believe that speed limit enfor-
cement practices should be secret—almost a form of “trade secret” by 
the police. The public should not be permitted to learn the enforcement 
thresholds—perhaps to keep them “on their toes.”53 
The speed limit is the clearest example of underenforcement, but 
not the only example. It is difficult to determine which traffic violations 
police enforce strictly and which they enforce laxly, given the lack of 
published policies. Many enforcement decision appear to be driven, sen-
sibly, by safety concerns. A driver who fails to signal at night, in the 
rain, in heavy traffic, may pose a genuine safety threat, and may well 
be pulled over for nothing more than the failure to signal. A driver who 
fails to signal during the daytime on a near-deserted road likely poses 
no danger to anyone and is unlikely to be pulled over for that infraction 
alone. 
Regardless of whether police adopt clear and public enforcement 
policies—as in the U.K.—or keep the enforcement policy shrouded in 
secrecy—as in the U.S.—what is clear is that police departments them-
selves choose to systematically underenforce certain traffic regulations, 
such as the speed limit. 
The upshot is that police departments control their own enforce-
ment policies, and the choice to systematically underenforce certain 
traffic regulations is just that—a choice by police departments. Under-
enforcement may be a reasonable approach to certain traffic regula-
tions. As the Court has noted, enforcement policies are generally viewed 
as an executive function, not under the control of the judiciary.54 
Once the police have chosen to consistently underenforce parts of 
the traffic code, the question then becomes whether it is reasonable  
for the police to arbitrarily enforce the laws against motorists whose 
 
53. See, e.g., Officer.com, supra note 48 (suggesting that there is no clear answer 
for when an officer will pull someone over for speeding). The person posing the 
question noted that his brother, an LAPD officer, would not tell him how 
much he could exceed the speed limit before being ticketed. One commenter, 
“Iowa #1603,” responded, “Well, we aren’t going to either.” Id. 
54. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996). 
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conduct does not violate those enforcement standards. This is the ques-
tion posed by the story told above, in which I in my role as professor 
adopted an underenforcement policy as to class starting time, and then 
arbitrarily chose to strictly enforce the policy against one student. 
The Whren decision totally fails to acknowledge this basic point—
that the widespread violation of the traffic code is caused primarily by 
police decisions to consistently underenforce parts of the traffic code. 
After noting that the traffic code is frequently violated, the Court 
states: 
[W]e are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at 
what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly 
violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary mea-
sure of the lawfulness of enforcement. And even if we could ident-
ify such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what standard (or 
what right) we would decide, as petitioners would have us do, 
which particular provisions are sufficiently important to merit 
enforcement.55 
The Court’s response here fails to recognize that a significant reason 
the traffic laws are “so commonly violated”—namely, police policy and 
practice to systematically underenforce the traffic code. This failure 
similarly undercuts the Court’s concluding observation. The Court is 
evidently uncomfortable with the idea that the judicial branch would 
determine “which particular provisions are sufficiently important to 
merit enforcement.”56 From the Court’s perspective, it is not clear why 
the judicial branch has any business making judgments about how to 
enforce the laws—a quintessential executive function. As Margaret 
Lawton has stated, “by determining when it is reasonable for a police 
officer to ignore violations of the law, is the court substituting its own 
judgment for the police officer’s—and the legislature’s—as to what the 
officer ‘should have’ done?”57 
The answer to this question is clearly “no.” The Court’s basic mis-
take lies in its failure to recognize that the enforcement standard comes 
from the police, not from the courts. Had the Court accepted petition-
er’s “reasonable officer” test, the courts would be doing nothing other 
than determining the policies that police departments themselves have 
 
55. Id. at 818–19. 
56.  Id. 
57. Margaret M. Lawton, The Road to Whren and Beyond: Does the “Would 
Have” Test Work?, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 917, 919 (2008). 
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adopted.58 It does not require the courts to determine, in the abstract, 
what sorts of traffic violations it is “reasonable” to enforce. Rather, the 
courts need simply determine what the police department itself has 
determined regarding when and how to enforce the traffic laws.59 This 
resolves both the “standard” issue and the “authority” issue—the stan-
dard comes from the police’s own enforcement policies, and the police 
are the appropriate authority to set enforcement policy. 
Nothing here requires law enforcement agencies to underenforce 
parts of the traffic code. There is no constitutional right to “de minimis” 
speeding. But when the police choose to adopt an enforcement policy 
whereby, for example, no driver will be pulled over for driving five mph 
(or less) over the speed limit, the police have created a situation where-
by strict enforcement against one driver will constitute arbitrary enfor-
cement of the traffic code. 
IV. Pretextual Stops As Entrapment 
One way to conceptualize the problem is to analogize this situation 
to the criminal law defense of entrapment. In an entrapment case, a 
defendant argues that he should be acquitted even if he committed the 
offense charged. The entrapment defense is satisfied if the defendant 
can show two elements: (1) that the defendant was “induced or persuad-
ed by law enforcement officers . . . to commit the offense,” and (2) that 
the defendant had no “previous intent or disposition or willingness to 
commit the crime charged.”60 
An early Supreme Court case discussed a rationale behind this 
defense: 
[I]t is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the estab-
lished law of the land to punish a man for the commission of an 
 
58. The suggested test was “whether the officer's conduct deviated materially 
from usual police practices, so that a reasonable officer in the same circum-
stances would not have made the stop for the reasons given.” Whren, 517 
U.S. at 814.  
59. See Maclin, supra note 3, at 378 (“The problem in Whren and other pretextual 
stop cases is not deciding ‘at what point a code of law becomes so expansive 
and so commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary 
measure of the lawfulness of enforcement.’ Rather, the problem is deciding 
whether officers jeopardize Fourth Amendment norms when they conduct 
seizures under a traffic code in a manner that brazenly deviates from normal 
procedures or wildly defies statistical expectations.” (quoting Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996))). 
60. Kevin F. O’Malley et al., 1A Federal Jury Practice and Instruc-
tions 768 (6th ed. 2008). See also Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 
63 (1988) (“[A] valid entrapment defense has two related elements: government 
inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defend-
ant to engage in the criminal conduct.”). 
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offense of the like of which he had never been guilty, either in 
thought or in deed, and evidently never would have been guilty 
of if the officers of the law had not inspired, incited, persuaded, 
and lured him to attempt to commit it.61 
This explanation is not complete, as it does not spell out why it is 
unconscionable for the government to punish in these circumstances. 
The Seventh Circuit has explained the fundamental rationale as follows: 
The federal government shall not use its resources to increase the 
criminal population by inducing people to commit crimes who 
otherwise would not do so. . . . A person who would not commit 
a crime unless induced to do so by the government is not a threat 
to society and the criminal law has no proper concern with him, 
however evil his thoughts or deficient his character.62 
Two distinct concerns can be identified. First is a concern over im-
proper government conduct: it is not a proper role of government in the 
liberal state to conduct itself in a way that encourage or induces its 
citizens to commit crimes, and then punish them when they fall prey 
to those inducements.63 The role of the state is to prevent individuals 
from committing harms to others, not to actively engage in conduct to 
determine whether any of its citizens harbors a weak character.64 
Second is a concern about punishing individuals who do not exhibit 
the right type of culpability. As the Court has stated, “[l]aw enforce-
ment officials go too far when they ‘implant in the mind of an innocent 
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its com-
mission in order that they may prosecute.’”65 A person with no predispo-
sition to commit a crime is a person who, left to his own devices, does 
not pose sufficient danger to society to justify punishing him.66 
 
61. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 444–45 (1932) (quoting Butts v. United 
States, 273 F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921)). 
62. United States v. Hollingsworth, 9 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1993). 
63. See Paul Marcus, The Entrapment Defense § 1.04B (4th ed. 2009) 
(discussing policy justifications behind the entrapment defense in Sorrells 
v. United States). 
64. Id. at § 1.04B n.52 (“[T]he proper use of the criminal law in a liberal society 
is to regulate potentially harmful conduct for the protection of society, 
rather than to purify the minds and to perfect character.”) (quoting United 
States v. Hollingsworth, 9 F.3d 593, 597–98 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
65. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553 (1992) (quoting Sorrells v. United 
States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932)). 
66. Marcus, supra note 63, at § 1.04B n.52 (“A person who would not commit 
a crime unless induced to do so by the government is not a threat to society 
and the criminal law has no proper concern with him, however evil his thoughts 
or deficient his character.”) (quoting United States v. Hollingsworth, 9 F.3d 
593, 598 (7th Cir. 1993)).  
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The concerns underlying the entrapment defense are also relevant 
to the issue at hand—arbitrary police enforcement of underenforced 
traffic regulations. In the context of speed limit enforcement, the prob-
lem becomes systematic. The police do not induce one (or a few) citizens 
to violate the written traffic code. Rather, through their consistent un-
derenforcement policy, the police induce almost all drivers to violate 
the written traffic code. 
As noted above, it is not a proper role of government in the liberal 
state to conduct itself in a way that induces its citizens to violate the 
law, and then punish them when they accept those inducements. In the 
context of speed limits, it is improper for the police to conduct itself in 
a way that encourages all drivers to drive in excess of the speed limit 
(up to a certain enforcement limit), and then arbitrarily punish a few 
drivers who—like others—are driving within the enforcement limits 
established by the police. 
Several of the commenters in the police forums, discussed above, 
expressed the view that the public has no right to know or understand 
the actual standards that police will use to enforce the traffic code. The 
“right thing” to do, these police explain, is not to speed at all—even 
though the police themselves routinely exceed the posted limit, and 
routinely fail to pull over those who exceed the posted limit. The de 
facto limit, in this view, is a police trade secret, and members of the 
public must proceed at their own peril— “stay in the slower end of that 
camp and keep your fingers crossed! Just don’t be the car in front or 
leading the pack.....LOL!”67 
The notion that drivers must simply “keep their fingers crossed” 
that they will not be arbitrarily selected by an individual police officer 
runs counter to the basic principles of the liberal state. Citizens are 
entitled to notice of the rules they are expected to follow, and a reason-
able opportunity to comply with those rules.68 
The second concern underlying the entrapment defense is the 
punishment of individuals who do not have the sort of culpability that 
justifies punishment. In the traffic context, police underenforcement 
sends the message to all drivers that driving five to ten mph over the 
speed limit is not sanction-worthy behavior. The police create and instill 
the general belief that moderate speeding, even though a violation of 
the written speed limit, is not the sort of behavior that warrants police 
intervention and enforcement. 
 
67. Officer.com, supra note 48. 
68. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (stating that the 
due process vagueness doctrine “may invalidate a criminal law for either of 
two independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice 
that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; 
second, it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement”). 
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As a consequence, almost all drivers, including careful, responsible 
drivers who assiduously seek to comply with most other laws and driv-
ing requirements, routinely drive in moderate excess of the speed limit. 
These individuals are not proper subjects for enforcement and sanction. 
In one sense, these moderate speeders exhibit a disregard for the law—
a disregard for the written speed limits. But the police, through their 
consistent enforcement practices, have illustrated to drivers that strict 
observance is not required, and thus moderate violations of the written 
code are not the sort of “disregard for the law” that the police believe 
warrant punishment. 
The argument in Part III rested on emphasizing the importance of 
police enforcement practices as opposed to focusing solely on the written 
traffic code. In the entrapment context, the Supreme Court recognized 
this same conflict between the written code and police practice—but 
unlike in Whren, the Court recognized the importance of holding the 
police accountable for their own practices. 
In an early entrapment case, at a time when it was not clear whe-
ther the entrapment defense would be recognized at all under federal 
law, the Court noted that the government’s arguments against entrap-
ment “rest entirely upon the letter of the statute.”69 The government’s 
rejection of entrapment as a defense took “no account of the fact that 
its application in the circumstances under consideration is foreign to its 
purpose”—the fact that the police were enforcing the law in a manner 
“so shocking to the sense of justice that it has been urged that it is the 
duty of the court to stop the prosecution in the interest of the Govern-
ment itself, to protect it from the illegal conduct of its officers and to 
preserve the purity of its courts.”70 
The argument here is not that the entrapment defense applies dir-
ectly to certain violations of the traffic code. After all, the entrapment 
defense is a defense to conviction, not a rule regarding enforcement. 
The point instead is that the concerns underlying the entrapment defen-
se are fully applicable to the question of pretextual enforcement. When 
police adopt enforcement practices that permit, tolerate, and in effect 
promote moderate violations of the traffic code, then arbitrary strict 
enforcement of the written code is unreasonable—it is improper conduct 
by the state, and it targets persons who are not proper subjects for law 
enforcement or sanction. And finally, as the Court recognized in the 
entrapment context, police enforcement practices are relevant to assess-
ing the fairness of punishing individuals, even as against individuals 
who violate the letter of the law. 
 
69. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 446. 
70. Id. 
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V. The False Danger of Fourth Amendment 
“Variability” 
The Whren Court raised an additional objection to the petitioner’s 
argument that law enforcement officers should be held to their own 
enforcement policies and practices. The concern is about local variabil-
ity of the Fourth Amendment: 
[P]olice enforcement practices, even if they could be practicably 
assessed by a judge, vary from place to place and from time to 
time. We cannot accept that the search and seizure protections 
of the Fourth Amendment are so variable, and can be made to 
turn upon such trivialities.71 
The Court here draws on an intuition that a constitutional right, 
being fundamental, cannot vary from place to place based on the differ-
ing enforcement policies of a local police department. 
This intuition is misplaced. At a fundamental level, the Fourth 
Amendment does depend on local laws, many of which vary from state 
to state and even municipality to municipality. In some areas, the speed 
limit is thirty-five mph, and thus observing a car traveling at thirty-
five mph does not furnish police with the probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion necessary to justify a stop under the Fourth Amendment. In 
other areas, the speed limit is twenty-five mph, and thus observing the 
same car traveling at thirty-five mph does furnish probable cause re-
quired to justify a stop under the Fourth Amendment. 
It is, therefore, misleading to suggest that the Fourth Amendment 
improperly “varies” from state to state or even from one stretch of road 
to another. The Fourth Amendment does not dictate any particular 
speed limit. The Fourth Amendment is thus consistent throughout the 
country, and the rule can be formulated in a uniform manner: police 
observation of a person driving in excess of the posted speed limit pro-
vides probable cause to stop the driver. What varies substantially from 
place to place is not the Fourth Amendment, but the posted speed 
limit. 
The same can be said of police enforcement policies. The general 
Fourth Amendment principle could be articulated as follows: If the 
police establish, through policy or consistent practice, a standard of 
enforcing a traffic rule only beyond some de minimis level, then police 
action contrary to the policy or practice is arbitrary and therefore un-
reasonable. Like the speed limit itself, those underlying enforcement 
policies and practices will likely vary from place to place. But the basic 
Fourth Amendment command—that police may not arbitrarily vary 
from the enforcement practices—does not change. 
The Court should not, of course, articulate a constitutional stand-
ard that is variable in a way that makes it difficult for law enforcement  
71. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (citation omitted). 
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officers themselves to understand and comply with the Fourth Amend-
ment limitations. But with variable police enforcement policies—as 
with variable speed limits—that problem does not exist. It may be 
difficult for a police officer from Anchorage, Alaska, to know and en-
force the speed limits in Albuquerque, New Mexico, but fortuitously 
enough, the enforcement of Albuquerque speed limits are left to local 
Albuquerque police officers. The same can be said of enforcement pol-
icies. An officer from Cleveland, Ohio, may not know the enforcement 
policies of the local police in Clarksburg, West Virginia, but the Cleve-
land officer is only required to enforce the laws in Cleveland, and can 
be fully expected to understand the traffic code enforcement policies of 
the Cleveland Division of Police (whatever they may be). 
The Court made a similar mistake in Fourth Amendment logic in 
Virginia v. Moore,72 holding that an arrest that was not authorized by 
state law did not thereby constitute an “unreasonable” seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment.73 The Court in Moore started with the uncon-
troversial point that the Fourth Amendment is not violated simply 
because some state law is violated. If a state by law provides greater 
restrictions on the police than those provided by the Fourth Amend-
ment, those state-law limitations do not thereby also become Fourth 
Amendment violations.74 The Moore Court gave the following example: 
the fact that the California constitution protects against warrantless 
search of an individual’s garbage does not mean that the Fourth 
Amendment thereby also provides this protection.75 
The Court then analogized to Whren, stating that “[w]e have app-
lied the same principle in the seizure context.”76 The Court noted that 
Whren “held that police officers had acted reasonably in stopping a car, 
even though their action violated regulations limiting the authority of 
plainclothes officers in unmarked vehicles.”77 Raising the “variability” 
concern, the Court explained, “[w]e thought it obvious that the Fourth 
Amendment’s meaning did not change with local law enforcement prac-
tices—even practices set by rule.”78 
Turning back to the issue at hand, the Court thus concluded that 
so long as there was probable cause of a state-law violation, an arrest 
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even if arrest for that 
offense was not authorized by state law.79 
 
72. 553 U.S. 164 (2008). 
73. Id. at 165. 
74. Id. at 171–172. 
75. Id. (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988)). 
76. Id. at 172. 
77. Id. (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 174. 
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While Moore was pending, Professor Orin Kerr argued that the 
contrary rule should prevail: 
The reason is simple: the “search incident to a lawful arrest” ex-
ception only permits searches incident to lawful arrests, not sear-
ches incident to unlawful arrests. Going back to English common 
law, courts have held that a lawful arrest justifies a search of the 
person pursuant to that lawful arrest. The lawfulness of the arrest 
has always been a critical part of the reasonableness of the search. 
Moore concerns an arrest by state police for a state crime. If  
the state law makes an arrest unlawful, any search incident to 
arrest is a search incident to an unlawful arrest rather than a 
search incident to a lawful arrest. It therefore violates the Fourth 
Amendment.80 
The Court’s “variability” concern thus represents a mistake about 
the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and state law. It is of 
course true that state law does not dictate the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment as a general matter. But in some contexts, the reasonable-
ness of conduct under the Fourth Amendment will depend on state law. 
In Moore, the state-law restriction on arrest meant that the arrest  
was not “lawful,” and thus the “search incident to lawful arrest” rule 
should not have been applied. The Fourth Amendment rule is that 
search-incident-to-lawful-arrest doctrine must be premised on a “lawful 
arrest”—and what constitutes a “lawful arrest” may well vary from 
place to place, depending on the law of the local jurisdiction. 
In Whren, the relevant Fourth Amendment principle is that an 
arbitrary seizure is unreasonable. If the police adopt an enforcement 
rule consistently permitting moderate speeding below a certain thres-
hold, then pulling over a car that is not exceeding that threshold is 
arbitrary and therefore unreasonable. It is not that the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibits stopping cars for minor traffic violations. It is that the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits arbitrariness. 
VI. Preventing Arbitrariness Is Not Enough to 
Prevent Discrimination 
This article has focused on one mistaken aspect of Whren—the 
Court’s failure to appreciate the arbitrariness that results from permit-
ting the police to randomly deviate from their ordinary traffic enforce-
ment practices. This is not the only objection to Whren. Many other 
commentators have focused on the problem of discriminatory law en-
forcement.81 
 
80. Orin Kerr, Why the Defendant Should Win in Virginia v. Moore, The 
Volokh Conspiracy (Jan. 7, 2008, 9:49 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/ 
1199753815.shtml [https://perma.cc/F8YZ-YEY3].  
81. See, e.g., supra note 3 (providing articles that are critical of Whren). 
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It is worth emphasizing that these are distinct problems. A traffic 
stop of a motorist for driving fifty-eight mph in a fifty-five-mph zone is 
likely arbitrary, but may not be discriminatory. A traffic stop of a 
motorist for driving sixty-eight mph in a fifty-five-mph zone might be 
discriminatory, but may not be arbitrary. Arbitrariness can be describe-
ed objectively—it is about unjustified deviations from the ordinary rules 
of traffic enforcement. Discrimination is typically subjective—it is ab-
out the motivations of the officer, regardless of the ordinary rules of 
traffic enforcement. 
Because “arbitrariness” and “discrimination” are distinct problems, 
it is also true that solving one will not necessarily be sufficient to solve 
the other. Under the “reasonable officer test”—advocated by the petit-
ioner in Whren and defended in this article—traffic stops would be 
deemed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if they were out of 
line with the police department’s enforcement policy and practice. This 
is an important principle, one rooted firmly in the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against arbitrary search and seizure. And yet this test would 
not be sufficient to end, or prohibit, discriminatory law-enforcement 
practices. Thus if we end to aim discrimination in law enforcement—as 
we should—putting an end to arbitrary stops is not enough. 
Whren’s problem of discriminatory law enforcement has been dis-
cussed extensively82—and for good reason. Whren’s problem of arbitrary 
law enforcement has received much less attention, which is why I have 
chosen to emphasize the point at length here. Prohibiting arbitrary law 
enforcement—by, among other things, requiring police to reasonably 
follow their own enforcement procedures—is a worthwhile goal, even 
though it is not the only important Fourth Amendment value. 
Conclusion 
The Court unanimously determined in Whren that a traffic stop is 
reasonable so long as there is probable cause that a traffic violation 
occurred. This conclusion, so stated, seems almost self-evident. Buried 
in that conclusion is a hidden principle that the Court failed to appreci-
ate—a principle related to arbitrary government conduct and holding 
police accountable for their own chosen enforcement policies. 
At the heart of Whren is an issue of arbitrary law enforcement. 
Police around the country systematically underenforce the traffic laws. 
They do not pull over drivers who drive sixty mph in a fifty-five-mph 
zone on a clear day. The police are fully entitled to adopt their own 
enforcement policies, including policies that systematically and con-
sistently underenforce the traffic code. But once the police have done 
so, it is arbitrary—and thus unreasonable—to randomly enforce minor 
violations and the written traffic code that do not trigger the police’s 
own enforcement policies. 
 
82. See supra note 3. 
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The Court’s failure to recognize this point is a basic flaw in Whren. 
The resulting decision authorizes improper police behavior—inducing 
almost all drivers to engage in moderate violations of the traffic code, 
and then arbitrarily stopping one of them on pretextual grounds. The 
decision likewise authorizes searches of persons who have not displayed 
the type of disregard for the law that should be required to trigger 
police scrutiny—as those drivers are merely following the commonly 
understood enforcement limits the police themselves have created and 
taught drivers to understand. In recognition of this fact, and in light of 
“experience and . . . facts newly ascertained”83 regarding the problem 
of discriminatory enforcement, the Court should revisit its holding in 
Whren. 
 
83. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 773 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986)). 
